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Introduction
The decades following the Second World War were ones of crucial social change in Turkey.
By the end of the 1950s, the social and political landscape of the country was transformed by demographic growth, expansion of education, development of industry, and massive migration to the cities and foreign countries. Settled mainly in the countryside, Alevis experienced this process of social change, which was characterised by urbanisation, social differentiation, the breaking down of former communities, and, more specifically, by the weakening of religious practice. Thus, in the 1960s they established closer contact with the "broader country" and partly lost their specificity.
However, the same years also witnessed the first Alevi public mobilisation of the Republican era, which initially had cultural dimensions centered around reviews and cultural events, and then political ones with the first "Alevi party", The Unity Party (BP/TBP) 1 . These developments may be considered as the indirect result of social change, and of the new conditions brought about by the multiparty system, political liberalisation and growing pluralism. Based on publications of the time 2 , interviews with people involved in this movement, and field work mainly in Sivas, this contribution first of all aims at giving a precise, descriptive account of these processes. Moreover, it tries to understand those who were the carriers and supporters of this movement. Finally, it attempts to provide an historical perspective, thus enabling comparisons with the contemporary Alevist 3 movement.
Migration and Social Change
Kemalist reforms extended the control mechanisms of the State to previously almost autonomous regions. The integration of formerly peripheral regions into industrial production, 1 Birlik Partisi (BP) created in 1966, later changed to TBP (Türkiye Birlik Partisi, Unity Party of Turkey). 2 I want to express my gratitude to Michael Meeker for his very valuable comments on a previous version of this text. I also thank the editor and bookseller Adil Ali Atalay, his son, as well as the lawyer Hasan Gülşan and the researcher Ali Yaman for providing issues of these publications -which are not conserved in any public libraryin Istanbul cellars and private archives. Finally, I thank the lawyers Hasan Basri Özbey and Muslim Özcan for giving me important documentation on TBP from their private archives. 3 I distinguish Aleviness (and Alevis), meaning the social phenomenon, from Alevism (and Alevists), which refers to the movement in the name of Aleviness, in the same way Islam and Islamism are distinguished. students in the village as well. Karaözü hosted six associations and a co-operative of agricultural credit founded in 1952, which brought together six surrounding villages and supplied its 900 members with credits. In the 330 houses, there were no less than 400 radios and 100 sewing machines. In the five coffee-houses, one could find more than thirteen dailies and many magazines. Of course, we have to assume that this village was more flourishing than the average; as a matter of fact, its income came first of all from agricultural production (notably market gardening), but also from the seventeen grocers, the bakery, and even a hotel (Otyam 1982 (Otyam [1963 : 124-126).
Obviously, this picture, which hardly hides the author's biased focus on development, did not hold true for all villages, and certainly not for all Alevi villages. Others had a more contentious or distanced relation to the state. An Alevi from the Sivas region confessed: "my family […] did not want to let me study, for it did not trust the state and those things."
(Interview December 2 nd 2000). However, this picture indicates some trends, like the importance some Alevis gave to education as a means of social mobility. As a consequence, the new employment opportunities released by the public sector, in the context of the development of the administration, gained a special importance as a source of jobs since there was hardly any Alevi bourgeoisie, craftsmen or merchants. As a matter of fact, employment in the public industries in Sivas (the railway yard and the cement factory) had been massively occupied by Alevis since their opening in the 1940s. Alevis' early integration into these jobs opened employment possibilities and facilities for their parents and friends as well 5 . Thus, strategies of social ascension through integration into the system, especially in civil service and factories, developed. Civil service, as well as liberal professions (doctors, lawyers, engineers) accessible through good school results, were therefore privileged by many Alevis.
Of course, factors limiting the chances of socially disadvantaged children applied to Alevis as much as to anyone else. Nevertheless, the ambition to acquire positions of influence often incited Alevis to mobilise all the resources of the family in order to facilitate those who had success as early as primary school. Those who profited from this help then became lawyers, teachers, officers or even MPs, and as such, became resources for those who had helped them (Gökalp 1980: 759) .
Moreover, as early as the late 1950s, Alevi craftsmen and merchants appeared in
Sivas. The son of a Sunni grocer from Sivas remembers as follows:
4 Created in the 1940s, village institutes had to train teachers for village schools. They were closed by the DP government in the early 1950s. See Öztürkmen 1998: 65-67. 5 Acquaintance was a widespread means of recruitment (Çoşkun 1995: 268-271 This trend strengthened in the 1970s with the rise of remittances from relatives in Europe and the return of workers from Germany (Rittersberger-Tılıç 1998), allowing many Alevis to settle as merchants or independent craftsmen in the cities.
Secularisation and Decline of Religious Practices
Migration and social differentiation induced a weakening of Alevi religious practice, and, especially in urban environments, many Alevi rituals were abandoned. This may be explained in terms of different factors.
Village communities and the relations between dede and talip, which were the framework for religious practice, were dismantled by migration: "Before, we were conducting cem every winter in the village. But with migration, it was not possible any more, and we could only do it every third or fifth year. (Interview with a dede from Sivas, November 27 th 2000)". The dede had no means of continuing to supervise their emigrant flock all over the country or even in Europe. Because it became harder to earn their living through purely religious activities, they had to find other forms of work, and this undermined their religious authority. When the dede themselves migrated to cities, their communities became orphans and religious understanding declined.
Nevertheless, in some cases, village-like conditions were partly revived for some time by the migrants in the cities. Some evidence indicates that cem were held in the cities for some of the villagers on the occasion of the visit of a dede (Karpat 1976:128) : "In the neighbourhood Altıntabak [Sivas], we did cem in secret. I remember a cem in 1963, we were afraid". In the big cities, some cem were held on a new community basis, the neighbourhood: The arrangements found in order to perpetuate the religious system were often temporary, and many dede stopped coming to the cities (Karpat 1976: 129) . The institutions supposed to guarantee the survival of the community (like musahiplik) declined progressively with their raison d'être. In urban environments, Alevis could not lean on traditional religious structures any more; they had no infrastructure in the city. Therefore, they were particularly affected by secularisation. The ruptures induced by migration were even more radical abroad (Naess 1988: 182) .
In addition, migration and social differentiation provoked the weakening of village hierarchies and other traditional structures, as well as a shift in social values (Mardin 1978) . The functions of the dede as the judge and carrier of religious knowledge were henceforth executed by teachers and judges, ultimately having a profound affect on the dede's authority. Many (especially left-wing) youngsters and migrants even rejected this authority outright.
Although freedom of religion was guaranteed by the 1960 Constitution (art. 19),
another factor that weakened the practice in urban environments was social pressure. With migration, Alevis came in closer contact with the surrounding society, and fear appears as a leitmotiv in the two previously cited testimonies. In Western Anatolian cities, there were assimilation trends, and even conversions. Alevi bourgeois and merchants from Senirkent, settled in Burdur, converted to Sunni Islam at the end of the 1940s (Öktem 2000) . In the 1960s, Jean-Paul Roux also observed conversions of Tahtacı in southern Turkey as a way of acquiring upward social mobility (Roux 1964: 52-53) . These topics, previously concealed by Alevis as well as by Sunnis, are now being discussed with regret and discomfort. December, 2000) .
A process of secularisation in the meaning of "progressive autonomization of social sectors that escape the domination of religious meanings and institutions" was thus set in motion (Berger and Luckman 1967: 118) . For the young generation, belief and its foundations remained an enigma, but it was often considered more as liberation than a loss (Väth 1993:216) . These developments seem to fit quite well into a "modernization" process such as developmentalists conceive it: migration, social differentiation, secularisation, cultural assimilation, weakening of community practices, etc. However, other indicators seem to point towards different trends.
Political Change
Along with the various developments mentioned above, after years of living with a one-party system, Turkey finally gained a multiparty system in 1946. Henceforth, every party had to convince the voters, and these gained the power to give their voice or not. Thus, the Kemalist "people" (halk) became a political clientele (Güneş-Ayata 1994), and religion gained new importance as an electoral argument.
Multiparti System : A New Political Logic
The Democrat Party (DP) 8 , created in 1946, endangered the domination of The Republican People's Party (CHP) 9 . It defended liberalism, equality, participation, a direct electoral system, and "the power to the people, not to the State", against the latter, considered to be centralist and bureaucratic. DP saw rural development as the key to an economic take-off, and therefore promised to provide resources to the peasants. It rapidly gained the support of the rural population. The elections of 1950 and, even more, of 1954, became a defeat for CHP, and a great victory for DP. 6 In 1992, he states that Tunceli Alevis did not practice muharrem fasting any more, that aşure was prepared more and more rarely, that the taboo on the eating of hare was not always respected, and that the cem ceremony tended to disappear (Bumke 1992 World War, Alevis were probably sensitive to agricultural matters (Schüler 1998: 264-265 (Schüler 1998: 262-263) . In Sivas, most Alevis seem to have supported the DP at the 1950 and 1954 elections as well (Coşkun 1995: 271-272 ). There were even some dede families among the founders of the local branch of DP (Interview with an ocakzâde from Sivas, November 20 th 2000). Some Alevis also were elected representatives of DP in Sivas (Interview with a local journalist in Sivas, December 6 th 2000). In the first years, religion was probably not a determining factor of the vote, which was much more influenced by the peasant factor and the liberation of a felt authoritarianism.
Religion as a Political Issue
This, however, changed quite rapidly. Alevis constituted an important electorate in many regions. Thus, at the 1966 senatorial elections, all parties, and CHP especially, wooed Alevi 10 Moreover, the fact that the liberal and conservative Nation Party (MP, Millet Partisi) , won five seats in Kırşehir constituency in 1954 was attributed to the influence of the Bektashi order in this region (Reed 1954 : 281) . But the popularity of Osman Bölükbaşı, the local party leader, has to be taken into account as well (Ahmad 1977: 371) .
voters (Mardin 1982: 186) . But the accession of Aleviness to the status of a political issue could also represent a risk: in the mixed regions, it proved difficult to combine pro-Sunni and pro-Alevi discourses in a convincing manner. DP seems to have tried by using Aleviness as an electoral argument in Sivas (Unbehaun 2001: 3-4) , and formulating different electoral speeches in Sunni and Alevi villages. While its politicians promised to construct İmam-Hatip schools in the Sunni villages, they recommended to Alevi villages: "let Sunni children go to the İmam-Hatip schools, while you educate your own children in modern schools" (Bozkurt 2000:?? ).
This double discourse being difficult to hold, right-wing parties rapidly adopted explicit Sunni discourses (Bozarslan 2002) . It was at this moment that DP insisted on religious topics like reintroducing the call to prayer in Arabic, and opening mosques and
İmam-Hatip high schools. It also began to woo brotherhoods, by calling the Nurcus to vote for DP, and by DP ministers expressing sympathy for the leaders of the Nurcu movement. While establishing new political dynamics, the multiparty system quickly led to the political use of religion. This may explain the departure of many Alevi voters from DP during the 1957 elections. Therefore, Alevi support for DP was often temporary. A few years later, the same poet Ali İzzet Özkan declaimed:
We thought that DP was a young girl It proved ugly, perfidious, widow It pretended to held its head high and have a pure face, we were mislead Its face has proven black, its head bald 12 .
11 Kıral öldü put kırıldı/Halas olduk cehaletten/Zulmün sarayı yıkıldı/Kurtulduk biz ezaretten/Çıktı Mehdi Demokrasi/Zalimin kesildi sesi/Allahuekber nidası/Bugün indi semavattan/ (Başgöz, 1979 (Başgöz, : 102, quoted by Çoşkun 1995 . 12 Demokrat Parti'yi taze kız sandık/Çırkın çıktı, kahpe çıktı, dul çıktı/Alnım açık, yüzüm ağ dedi kandık/Yüzü kara çıktı, Başı kel çıktı/ (Başgöz, 1979 (Başgöz, : 134, quoted by Çoşkun 1995 .
Political Liberalisation and the Beginning of an Identity Movement
In the course of the 1950s, DP became more authoritarian. The government pestered the opposition by different means and monopolised political institutions (Landau 1974: 4) . On
May 27 th 1961, a military coup overthrew DP. Many members of the party were judged for corruption, unconstitutional activities or high treason, and its leaders were executed. This coup was widely considered a liberal attempt to restore secularism and Kemalism. The National Unity Council withdrew from power, after having adopted a new Constitution which reaffirmed secularist principles and put secularisation measures taken by the early Republic under constitutional protection. The 1960 coup and the Constitution that followed in its wake were welcomed by a number of Alevis. Considered guilty of having supported Kemalism, Alevis had been partly held away from political life during the DP period. Sure of the support of the governing party, the Directorate of Religious Affairs (DIB) 13 had even resumed some of the insulting Ottoman policies against Alevis (Bilici 1996: 288) .
The will of the officers to bring about debates on topics considered until then as taboo, and to bring social reforms, brought about a new intellectual atmosphere (Mardin 1978: 233) . This liberal Constitution recognised pluralism and the existence of social groups, and guaranteed the right to strike, as well as freedom of thought, expression, association and publication. Diverse social, political and/or religious forces could manifest themselves, encouraged by the development of the media. This liberal climate fostered political differentiation, itself encouraged by social differentiation and growing regional inequalities.
The growing working class as well as the rural population gained combativeness through labour unions (Landau 1974 , Vaner 1984 . In short, social and political boundaries became more pronounced, new social and associative movements appeared, and the parties 
The Setting of the Alevi Issue on the Political Agenda
Within this general framework, the "Alevi issue" appeared in public space for the first time.
Alevis demanded that the principles of equality and brotherhood proclaimed by the Republic be applied to them as well, and their specificity admitted. For Sunnis, Aleviness became a matter of concern, not only because it was perceived as heresy, but also because it seemed to constitute a favourable ground for leftist ideas and for "separatism". Although the official doctrine did not admit any segregation of the Alevis, in practice, politicians formulated more and more frequent warnings regarding a possible Alevi subversion (Dumont 1991: 161 within DİB, so that "all Muslim communities be treated equally" (Özbey 1963: 6) . The aim of this reform was to guarantee that all religious groups existing in Turkey would be represented within DİB. Immediately, the right-wing and religious press 18 became offensive and accused the project of "bringing mum söndü 19 ceremonies into the mosques" (Şener and İlknur 1995: 81 In response, approximately fifty Alevi students in Ankara prepared a declaration. But Kurdish and Turkish students would not agree to its title, with Kurdish Alevis rejecting the wording, "to the big Turkish nation" (Büyük Türk Ulusuna) and opting for "to all the people of Turkey"
instead. In the end, only four Law students signed it:
16 Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi. 17 This word originally designates the four Islamic law schools. In Turkey, it often means "denominational group" and is used to designate Sunnis on the one side and Alevis on the other. For lack of a better term, it will be translated with "denomination". This declaration was widely broadcast in the newspapers and supported by many editorialists.
A second statement was prepared by Alevi students and published in Türkiye on April 22 nd , 1963; it was followed by another declaration signed by 347 students in Istanbul and published in Türkiye (why have you written "hareket" instead of Türkiye ?), May 1 st 1963 as a reaction to a play entitled "Mum söndü" at the City Theatre 21 (Şener and İlknur 1995 : 82) . Panels on secularism were also organised (Özbey 1963 brotherhood (tarikat). For Ali Rıza Ulusoy, Aleviness was neither a religion nor a brotherhood, but an Islamic vision, "islami görüş" (Özbey 1963: 43) . The use of the term mezhep was quite imprecise as well. The idea that there were two mezhep (Sunni and Shiite)
was often expressed and differences between the four Sunni schools of thought were blurred.
The main argument put forward by defenders of Aleviness to legitimise its place in the Republic was its presumed Turkishness. Like Cemal Özbey, Ali Rıza Ulusoy thus spoke of "Alevi Turks", Alevi Türkler, and considered them "defenders of the national tradition and character". For him, Hacı Bektaş was not the founder of a brotherhood, but first of all the defender of Turkishness (Özbey 1963: 44-46) : "Insofar as they represent Turkey's pure and immaculate Turkishness, accusing them [of practising mum söndü ceremonies] is a denial of, and an attack on, Turkishness" (Özbey 1963: 15-16 The second argument legitimating the Alevis' place in the Republic was their defence of the country and the Kemalist principles. Their presumed role in the liberation war and their support of Atatürk were stressed again and again. This argument was opposed by some Sunni circles that accused Alevis of having supported the Kemalist occidentalist project merely as a means of defending their economic and social interests, thus denying them any merits as citizens (Laçiner 1984: 239) . This stress on Turkish nationalism is interesting, since in the 1960s some middle-age Alevis in the villages were quite explicit about Aleviness as linked with Iran, saying that they would pray in a mosque if and when the Shah of Iran came to Turkey. This was a position which put them completely at odds with Turkish Nationalism, and it was not reflected in the public debates at all 25 .
Moreover, the argument of Turkey's unity was very much stressed 26 . Defenders of Alevis stigmatised the behaviour of religious-minded people as schismatic and dangerous for the national unity: Cemal Özbey accused the right of breaking "our unity and integrity", milli birlik ve bütünlüğümüzü, in order to provoke a war between mezheps. The press equally warned about the threat of fragmentation: it accused those who did not want to recognise freedom of religion of attempting to create divisions, and in this way becoming the enemies of the whole people 27 : "At the very time when we need unity and national solidarity more than ever, the authors don't have the right to sow the seeds of discrimination among Muslims, among the people" (Özbey 1963:17) . In addition, the religious-minded activists were called "fanatic opportunists", çıkarcı yobazlar, enemies and exploiters of religion who practice systematic provocation (Fikret Otyam in Özbey 1963: 39) . Principles of equality and freedom of faith were highlighted, and the Alevis were praised as their defenders.
A last series of arguments referred to more general values, sometimes even to human rights. Defenders of Alevis presented them as linked to unity, but also to morality, human values, progressiveness and solidarity. In this call to universal values, the religious- press referred to it as "Alevis doing propaganda for the left". Actually, this manifestation was supported by the left-wing TİP. Even proceedings were started against this manifestation, but in the end no one was arrested. (Norton 1992) . Nevertheless, as early as the opening ceremony, a military General, invited for the needs of the protocol, expressed suspicions towards Alevis (Kaleli 2000: 19) . As a matter of fact, it became obvious that the festival served as a rallying point for Alevis and Bektashis, and that some "folkloric" spectacles played a mobilizing role (Dumont 1991: 162) .
Another aspect of this Alevi turmoil was the creation of newspapers and In the section, "letters to the Editor", theological issues were sometimes discussed. Most of the time, however, the readers wrote to complain about insulting remarks or bad treatment inflicted on Alevis, especially by imams. The main part of the magazine was devoted to comments on current events and debates with various Sunni religious groups. In particular, the magazine contained many attacks against the Nurcu and Süleymancı brotherhoods, which it accused of infiltrating the religious apparatus and setting public opinion against Alevis. One of the themes frequently developed, especially by academics (including Sunnis), was that Alevis were full-fledged Turkish citizens, and that the existing juridical and constitutional equality should reflect this fact. Cem estimated that a strict application of secularist principles, associated with religious freedom, could alone provide a secure environment for Alevis (Dumont 1991: 163-164 The public debate on Aleviness spearheaded by these publications was reinforced by several events: In 1966, İbrahim Elmalı, the director of DİB, declared that Aleviness had disappeared, and the reaction of the Alevi public and media were so strong that he was forced to resign (Dumont 1991: 164-165) . Sunni dignitaries replied with thinly veiled threats against Alevis (Kaleli 1990: 188) . Some weeks later, in a memorandum on the "fight against harmful currents", the Chief of General Staff presented Alevis as instruments manipulated by international Communism. Again, the magazine Cem criticised him in virulent tones (Dumont 1991: 165) .
Who were the carriers of this movement? First of all, the influence of the Ulusoy family 32 , but also of Bektashi circles, was significant, especially in the creation of the Hacıbektaş festival. This rapprochement between Alevis and Bektashis was the fruit of convergent interests: some Alevi migrants used the association with Bektashism, which was 28 More precisely, the "Tourism" association which organised the Hacıbektaş festival. 29 Launched as an "independent political newspaper defending secularism and freedom of consciousness, for God and the people". 30 Launced as a "Current, literary, religious newspaper". 31 Since I could not find the complete collections of these newspapers, it remains difficult to know until when they were published, if they followed one another -as their approximate publication periods seem to indicateor if they were published simultaneously. 32 According to Mustafa Timisi, the members of the Ulusoy family did not launch the mobilisation. At the beginning, they had to stay in the background because of the watch on them by the authorities. When the movement developed, different members could then become more active. Interview with Mustafa Timisi, Ankara, 6 th December, 2000. less taboo than Aleviness at the time, to integrate in a new urban environment (Karpat 1976: 128) and to facilitate contacts with an established urban elite (Interview with Seyfi Oktay, Ankara, 17 th September, 2001 ). This rapprochement probably permitted some Bektashis to find popular and massive grassroots. Aside from this, two groups seem to have been particularly active in BP: on the one hand, there was an elite, urbanised decades earlier 33 , in which the big families played an important role -these were the ones responsible for publishing the newspapers and reviews); on the other hand, there were the first Alevi students -the second generation of migration, and the first ones to benefit from access to the superior educational system. Like Kurdish and Islamic movements, Alevist mobilisation was generated by the double processes of urbanisation and mass education. It appeared in the cities, where students, intellectuals, and later, migrant workers experienced their "otherness" in relation to the surrounding population, as well as occasional incidents of discrimination.
Who did these public debates and initiatives around Aleviness reach? Associations probably gathered only a small minority of Alevis. However, in some villages, there were also attempts to codify a written Aleviness, leaning on principles of beliefs and practices. These attempts were carried out by individuals in their 40s and 50s, who were not necessarily ocakzade. This shows that the villages were neither intellectually isolated, nor passive 34 .
The Unity Party (BP/TBP)
The Creation of a "Denominational" Party?
In this climate of turmoil, several Alevis were attacked by Sunnis in Ortaca (near Muğla) in July 1966, under the pretext that they had burned the mosque and destroyed the minaret 35 .
After this event, different initiatives aiming to politically organise Alevis appeared. The creation of the Unity Party (BP/TBP) coincided with the launching of the magazine Cem, which supported the idea that Alevis should gain influence through their own party and further covered the formation of the party. The publisher and owner of the magazine also had a direct link with the party, being the president of its Istanbul branch.
33 Among the founding members of Hacı Bektaş Kültür, Kalkınma ve Yardım Derneği, there was a hotel manager, two businessmen, a journalist and printer, but only one farmer (Kaleli, 2000: 19 The party was created on October 17 th , 1966 by people "without political experience" (Teziç, 1976: 336) , its President being a retired general 36 , and its General 318). Defining itself as Kemalist, secularist and progressive, refusing conflicts of class and confession, this party advocated a planned economy controlled by the state, and it promised the redistribution of land (Teziç 1976: 335-336) . Nevertheless, the explanation emphasizing the economic interests of Alevi merchants from Anatolia seems exaggerated, since the party's first initiators were located in Ankara and Istanbul, even though they were soon followed by 36 Hasan Tahsin Berkman, born in 1904, from Çorum, retired since 1958. 37 The founding members were: Cemal Özbey, lawyer from Arguvan (Malatya province) was the General Secretary, and Hüseyin Günal (building contractor) and Tahsin Tosun Sevinç (trade-unionist) his assistants. Among the other were also Feyzullah Ulusoy, Salim Delikanlı and Hüseyin Eren (retired colonels), Mustafa Geygel (building contractor), Mehmet Güner and Mehmet Ali Egeli (economists), Hüseyin Erkanlı and Faruk Ergünsoy (lawyers), Mustafa Topal (doctor), Arif Kemal Eroğlu and İbrahim Zerze (workers), and Hüseyin Dedekargınoğlu (printer) (Cumhuriyet, 18 th October 1966 ; Kaleli, 2000: 33) . 38 Cem n°29, October 1993, p. 27-28.
TİP has now discovered this fertile issue. They have been trying to make political capital out of the Sunni / Alevi division by fostering a political connection between the freethinking urban supporters of their party and the traditional mystic Alevi communities. […] It is no doubt in order to forge more effective links with the Alevi community that the annual convention of this party in the winter of 1966 was held in the province of Malatya (Yalman 1969: 59-60 refusing to play the role that AP had foreseen, it became a political formation on its own in 1970. Refusing to appear as a "denominational" party, it stressed that "99% of the people is Muslim" (Laçiner 1984: 243) . It was closed down in 1971 after the coup, and reorganised in 1972 under the name of The National Salvation Party, MSP, Milli Selamet Partisi.
39 Cem 29, October 1993, p. 27.
The Turn to the Left
As early as its creation, BP seemed torn by the question of whether it should be an open "denominational" party (i.e., assume its "denominational" dimension), or a progressive, Kemalist party instead, which over the course of the 1970s gradually meant a leftist party.
This tension became apparent through the competition between the two main wings: the "religious" one, led by Cemal Özbey and Hüseyin Bazlan, and the more "political" one, led As early as March 18 th , 1967, Hüseyin Balan was elected General Secretary. Even if, in their public declarations, the founders adamantly refused to be labeled Alevi, certain formulations of the manifesto showed the importance given to the religious issue, and, a fortiori, an Alevi orientation -even without mentioning confession explicitly. The party advocated:
[…] the protection of freedom of consciousness, of faith and opinion for all; tolerance of all sorts of religious worship and ceremony provided they do not threaten public order and are not conflicting with the general moral representations nor to the laws that protect them; no one shall be obliged to participate in worship or religious services, or to reveal its religious convictions; and no one shall be condemned for his beliefs and religious representations (The political program of BP, Birlik Partisi Programı, art. 9 ).
Because of the need "to ensure equality of rights and religious equality, as well as to avoid coercion", religious education had to inculcate the students with secularist principles such as Revolutionarism, Reformism, progressiveness, unity, solidarity and tolerance. In this view, religious education, like worship itself, should not be monopolised by a single religion or a given faith (Birlik Partisi Programı, art. 15; Ahmad and Turgay-Ahmad 1976: 336) .
In 1969, in its first elections, BP gained 2,8% of the valid votes and eight MPs, of which three came from the Ulusoy family 40 . This result was not very spectacular 41 , but superior to that of other new, small formations present on the political scene at that timefor example, the MHP. The BP showed much regionally differentiated results (Schüler 1998: 267-269) . It achieved most success in central and eastern Anatolia, and notably in religiously "mixed" regions, with a record of 16,7% in the Sivas province (Özbudun 1976: 110) , probably because of the popularity of Mustafa Timisi in his region of origin.
In 1969, during its second congress, BP was renamed The Unity Party of Turkey, TBP, Türkiye Birlik Partisi, in order to put an end to the rumours which accused it of working for a division of Turkey, or on behalf of Iranian interests (Yücel 1998: 66 (Teziç 1976: 336) . 40 The MPs were Hüseyin Balan (Ankara), Haydar Özdemir (Istanbul), Kazım Ulusoy (Çorum), Ali Naki Ulusoy (Amasya), Yusuf Ulusoy (Tokat), Sami İlhan (Malatya), Mustafa Timisi and Hüseyin Çınar (Sivas). 41 It is important to point out that the party did not present candidates in many provinces, including provinces with a considerable Alevi population, like Giresun or Gümüşhane (Karpat 1975: 116 Henceforth, the party presented itself as a revolutionary, anti-fascist party of the working class, and positioned itself on the left of CHP, in competition with TİP, which was closed down during the 1971 coup (Schüler 1998 : 266) .
In 1973, the electoral manifesto clearly indicated this shift to the left with slogans such as:, "Long live a freer, more independent and more democratic Turkey !",; or by materialist issues like the liberation of peasants, workers and the "exploited". Being antiimperialist, the party advocated the end of the relations with NATO and the Common Market.
It resumed the six principles of the CHP, with some interpretative differences, and added some leftist principles as well 44 .
Even after this leftist shift TBP did not really abandon claims relating to religious matters. On the contrary, it attempted to reconcile religious beliefs and socialist principles: Therefore, TBP did not succeed in gathering Alevi votes. As TBP was "an organisation cutting vertically through social classes, [it was a] representative of the ideology of a denominational community" (Sencer 1971: 343) , and the Alevis were doubtless too socially and economically differentiated to gather in a party whose program had for single originality an Alevi symbolic. In addition to internal discord, this failure also had external reasons like the competition of more credible parties in the same niche. The fiasco of TBP indicates that there was no room, in the 1970s, for a party devoted -even implicitly -to the defence of a "denominational" minority. With the growing correspondence between Sunni
Islam and right-wing Nationalism, young Alevis moved gradually towards the secular left and sometimes actively turned against the dede and religious practices. Aleviness could not attain the place occupied by orthodox Islam in political discourse, and the Alevis did not succeed in transforming their religious system into a mobilising political ideology (Bayart 1982 : 114) . 46 Interview with a former member of the TBP's assembly, Ankara, 23th November, 2000.
Conclusion
In the 1960s, in the course of urban migration, Alevis experimented with a radical process of social and religious change characterized by the breaking down of former communities and the loss of religious practice. They sociologically "integrated the broader country" and partly lost their specificity.
However, the same years also witnessed the first Alevi public mobilization of the Republican era, which had both cultural and political dimensions. Religion became a political issue, and the "denominational" variable became a determinant element of political space. At the same time, however, the worker and student movements of the 1960s indicated growing horizontal mobilisation. In these conditions, can we speak about the formation of an Alevi political space ? Many analysts assert that Alevis were by and large in favour of CHP's opinions which, in the 1960s, progressively turned from Kemalism to Socialism. Moreover, it is generally admitted that a good part of the voices that permitted TİP to obtain fifteen seats at the 1965 elections came from Alevis. In the 1969 elections, in Tunceli, TİP obtained much better results (16,8% of the votes) than TBP (6,9%). TBP was influential in the same region as TİP, which some observers explain by the numerical importance of Alevis (Özbudun 1976: 110) . Thus, the 1960s show the emergence of an Alevi political space, but one that was not monopolised by a single political party.
